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A Change of Affections:
The Development, Dynamics, and Dethronement
of John Wesley’s “Heart Religion”
Randy L. Maddox
This is the religion we long to see established in the
world, a religion of love and joy and peace, having
its seat in the heart, in the inmost soul, but ever
showing itself by its fruits, continually springing
forth, not only in all innocence … but likewise in
every kind of beneficence, in spreading virtue and
happiness all around it.1
Is there a more appropriate longing for the church as Christians stand at
the outset of a new millennium than this one voiced over a quarter of a
millennium ago? Or have the conflicts and disappointments of the last century left
us so brazened that it appears hopelessly idealistic? John Wesley clearly did not
consider it unrealistic when he articulated this as the driving vision of Methodism.
If his current descendants do, it might be because we have lost touch with
Wesley’s emphasis on how this religion must find its seat in the heart in order for
it to be manifest in spreading virtue and happiness in the world. This emphasis
was definitive of Wesley’s mature conception of the Christian life, a conception
that he often labeled simply “heart religion.”
4The quote above comes from the introduction of An Earnest Appeal to
Men of Reason and Religion, a tract Wesley issued in response to early critics of
his movement. He discerned misunderstandings and caricatures of his model of
heart religion behind many of these critiques. The care he took to rebut these
misunderstandings reveals how central heart religion was to his vision of the
mission of Methodism. Thus one can imagine how troubled he would be by the
misunderstandings and caricatures reflected in debates about and (often
reactionary) neglect of heart religion among his theological descendants. The
purpose of this book is to invite Wesley’s current heirs to engage in a renewed
dialogue with his convictions about heart religion as we ponder our mission and
needs in confronting the new millennium. 
This chapter provides initial background for such a dialogue, seeking to
clarify Wesley’s convictions in their own right. The first section contends that
Wesley’s emphasis on heart religion was neither accidental nor merely rote, it
developed as part of a conscious transition in his valuation of the role of the
affections in Christian life. The second section traces the dynamics of Wesley’s
heart religion, focusing on how it involves a change of one’s affections. The final
section suggests how a philosophical “change of affections” among his early heirs
has played a part in the eventual dethroning of Wesley’s conception of heart
religion in many Methodist/Wesleyan circles.
The Development of Wesley’s Heart Religion:
 A Change of Affections 
The opening quote speaks of benevolent actions springing from a heart of
love. While this might seem a mere poetic image, Wesley’s choice of terms
reflects his mature stance on the issues of moral psychology, issues central to his
heart religion. “Moral psychology” is the technical title for proposed accounts of
the dynamics involved in moral choice and action. At issue here are such
questions as: Are our options really open at the juncture of moral choices or acts?
If the option is open in some meaningful sense, what most hinders us from
choosing as we ought? And, what would most effectively “free” us to choose
differently? Competing responses to these questions populate the history of
philosophical debate, and have direct corollaries in Christian theological accounts
of spiritual/moral life. The range of differing responses is too broad to be
rehearsed
5 here.2 Suffice it to say that they differentiate in terms of: 1) whether they see
human choice as totally determined or retaining some element of authentic self-
determination, and 2) what they value as the most positive dynamic (e.g., reason,
habit, emotion, etc.) in human willing.
The Moral Psychology in which Wesley was Nurtured
The best way to clarify the moral psychology embedded in Wesley’s
mature heart religion is to start with the stance in which he was nurtured, and
which he came to consider less than fully adequate. The most influential voices in
Anglicanism at the beginning of the eighteenth century assumed a moral
psychology with roots running back to Plato.3 Plato’s central emphases were
appropriated early in Christian spirituality and the resulting model became quite
prominent in the tradition. This model emphasizes our ability to reason as what
provides humans with some capacity for self-determination. By contrast, it
identifies the greatest obstacle to moral rectitude as the passional dimension of
human life—i.e., those emotional reactions, instincts, and the like that are not a
product of our rational initiative or under fully conscious control. The normative
corollary is that truly moral choice and action require subjecting this distracting
passional dimension of life to rational control. This is admittedly not an easy task,
but the central stream of this Christian tradition has assumed that through regular
practice—empowered by grace—we can habituate an increased aptitude for
maintaining moral rectitude.
A richer sense of this “habituated rational control” model of spirituality
can be gained by watching the moral/spiritual advice issued by one who assumes
it. The most relevant candidate for such illustration is Wesley’s mother! As one
who was of necessity self-taught, Susanna Wesley was remarkably well-read in
Anglican theological and spiritual writings (where this model was broadly taken
for granted). She was also remarkably committed to the spiritual and theological
formation of her children. While much of this formation was oral, we have
available written examples in letters she sent to her sons when they left home to
study and in catechisms she prepared for her children when they were temporarily
dispersed by the burning of the rectory in Epworth.
Letters sent to her eldest son, Samuel Jr., give an initial sense of what
John would have imbibed in his earliest years under her tutelage.
6In the first letter to which we have access (less than a year after John’s birth)
Susanna instructs Samuel Jr. that moral law conforms to reason, and that as
“rational voluntary agents” humans are virtuous only when we conform our
behavior to moral law.4 In a subsequent letter she posits the obvious corruption of
the human passions as evidenced by their being “so easily and strongly excited by
the sensitive appetite,” and warns Samuel Jr. that these corrupt passions and
appetites are the place where “Satan draws all his auxiliary forces and fights us
with our own weapons.”5 This assumption stands behind her later exhortation to
“moralize all your thoughts, words, and actions, which will bring you to such a
steadiness and constancy as becomes a reasonable being and a good Christian.”6
The theological framework of the convictions about moral psychology
reflected in this advice to Samuel Jr. is evident in other materials. In the
catechetical letter prepared—when John was 6 years old—for her daughter Suky
(Susanna Jr.), Susanna portrays the original “test” of Adam and Eve in the Garden
as “whether they would deny their sensual appetites and keep the body in a due
subjection to the mind, or whether they would prefer the pleasures of sense and
thereby dethrone their reason,” and says that their option for sensuality led not
only to their ruin but to the depravity of all subsequent humanity.7 She reflects on
the practical embodiment of this depravity in her journal:
How is it that [the mind’s] convictions have so little effect?
Whence proceeds this constant perverseness in the affections that
they do not immediately follow the dictates of the understanding
and judgment? In the order of nature the understanding should
direct the judgment, that the will, and that should excite the
affections … but in things of a moral nature ‘tis often quite
otherwise, and by a stronger corrupt reverse of the action of the
soul the order of nature is inverted and the passions gain the
ascendant over the superior powers.8
How can this corruption be overcome? Susanna is clear that mere human effort
will not suffice; we need divine aid, but she focuses this need in intellectual
terms:
The philosophy of the whole world hath not sufficient force to
conquer the propensions of corrupt nature. Appetites and passions
will bear sway [despite] all our fine speculations, till our minds be
enlightened by some higher principle by virtue of which light it
discerns the moral turpitude of those things in which before it
placed its supreme happi-
7ness, and the beauty of that virtue and holiness that it was
accustomed to despise.9
Susanna credits the source of this higher principle as the Holy Spirit, who
“enlightens and enlarges the understanding and purifies the affections,” all with a
goal to “inclining or disposing to, strengthening, and confirming the will in the
paths of virtue.”10 But the Spirit does not work in a unilateral manner, we have an
active role to play. As she exhorts herself in her journal: “We must preserve the
government of reason and not suffer our passions to get the ascendant over us. …
If our affections are but purified, the work is done. … Therefore, be sure to be
very hearty and earnest in praying to God for strength to govern and regulate your
affections.”11
Susanna’s advice continued in a similar vein to John as he undertook his
own theological study at Oxford. For example, in a 1725 letter she admonishes
him to remember that true human happiness consists in a due subordination of our
“inferior” powers (like passions and bodily appetites) to the “superior” powers of
our rational nature.12 Her response later that year to John’s inquiry whether
religious zeal is ever inappropriate is of particular interest. This response begins
with love as an affection that “moves” human behavior and shifts to love as a
moral principle for controlling the movements of the affections. After affirming
that zeal is a natural and legitimate effect of love, Susanna’s letter turns to an
exhortation that any visible expressions of zeal be under due restriction, “always
according to knowledge, and strictly guarded by prudence and Christian charity
[i.e., love].” As she expounds the latter consideration: “Love to God and love to
our neighbour … is, or ought to be, the principle and rule of all our thoughts,
words and actions with respect to either. And whatever we do for God or
[neighbour] that flows not from this principle, and is not squared by this rule is
wrong.”13 The moral role or contribution of love is clearly focused more on its
status as a rational principle or rule than on its status as an affection!
This comparative valuation is typical of a habituated rational control
moral psychology. Plato deemed the affections/passions to be indispensable to
moral life inasmuch as they are the generators of motive power for human action.
At the same time, he viewed this as essentially raw power, with no inherent moral
orientation. While he suggests some differing resistance to taming among the
sources of motive power, with the “appetites” (the dark horse) being more
resistant than the “spirited element” (the white horse), it is finally reason (the
charioteer) that he
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than ill.14 Christian appropriations of Plato generally retained his portrayal of the
passions/affections as generators of motive power. They also carried over his
assumption that this power lacks inherent orientation toward morally appropriate
ends. Indeed the Christian conviction that humans are presently “fallen” has led
many of these appropriations to suggest that at least some of our motive
inclinations are inherently negatively oriented. A few make this a constitutive
difference by gathering the more recalcitrant motive powers under the label
“passions” (Plato’s dark horse) while designating the more neutral or innocent
powers the “affections” (Plato’s white horse).15 Most use “affections” and
“passions” interchangeably, arguing that the negative orientation is a corruption
of originally neutral powers.16 Either way, the emphasis remains on the need to
direct these motive powers to moral ends by asserting rational guidance and
control over them.
This emphasis stands behind Susanna’s comparative valuation of the role
of love in the Christian life. She clearly values the motive power generated by
love as a native human affection. Indeed, she can praise love as the strongest of
the human affections, suggesting it is the source of the power of all other
affections. But she immediately adds that the target of this affection is not
inherently normed, it can be either well or ill-placed. This, she argues, is why the
primary rational duty laid upon humanity is to direct our love fully to God—to
love God with all our heart, mind, soul, and strength.17 She reminded John often
of this duty in the years of his nurture.
Wesley’s Initial Appropriation of a “Habituated Rational Control” Moral
Psychology
The early (i.e., pre-Aldersgate) Wesley’s personal appropriation of the
moral psychology in which he was nurtured is evident in manuscript sermons and
letters that we have from this period. When he considers the pre-fallen state of
humanity, he describes it as a situation where Adam’s will naturally followed the
dictates of his understanding and his affections were “rational, even, and
regular.”18 Accordingly, his prescribed model for winning fallen souls is first to
instruct and strengthen the understanding, then to “regulate” the affections.19 And
if one looks for the role of love (or the “heart”) in all this, the primary emphasis
remains
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principle of love. As John summarized his understanding in a 1731 letter:
To love God I must be like Him, holy as He is holy; which implies
both the being pure from vicious and foolish passions and the
being confirmed in those virtues and rational affections which God
comprises in the word charity. In order to root those out of my soul
and plant these in their stead I must use, (1) such means as are
ordered by God, (2) such as are recommended by experience and
reason.20
What means did Wesley have in mind for this transformation? The best
indication is his earliest publications. For example, Wesley resonated with the
moral advice of the Cambridge Platonist John Norris that he read during his
Oxford years to the point that he self-published (as his second and third
publications) extracts of two of Norris’s works.21 The Treatise Concerning
Christian Prudence particularly reflected Norris’s Platonic moral psychology. Its
general theme is that Christians should follow God’s commandments—not so
much out of a motivation of love or fear as for the prudential reason that God has
designed it that this will bring us happiness.22 The background assumption in the
book is that all who seek to do this must battle the passions. The latter are
described as powerful, yet deaf and blind, therefore truly prudent Christians are
advised to begin regulating the passions in their earliest years.23 Dutiful obedience
of the commandments is the chief means to this regulation, but Norris also details
a set of “subordinate” means that aid in this effort. Primary emphasis is placed on
prayer, reading Scripture, and hearing the Word preached—as settings that
directly address reason, building resolve to exercise its executive role. While
receiving sacraments and attending corporate worship are also briefly mentioned,
it is under the tone that these are bounden duties because they encourage
Christian practice.24 The nearly exclusive rational focus of the means of grace for
Norris (and the early Wesley) is clear.
Against this background, and in retrospect of later developments, the most
suggestive expression of the early Wesley’s moral psychology is in his first
publication. In 1733 Wesley drew from several sources to produce a Collection of
Forms of Prayer. The first prayer (for Sunday morning) centers on the duty of
love:
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I know, O Lord, that thou hast commanded me, and therefore it is
my duty, to love thee with all my heart, and with all my strength. I
know thou art infinitely holy and overflowing in all perfection; and
therefore it is my duty so to love thee. … Give thy strength unto
thy servant, that thy love may fill my heart, and be the motive of
all the use I make of my understanding, my affections, my senses,
my health, my time, and whatever other talents I have received
from thee.… O let me fulfil this great duty. Permit me not to be in
any delusion here; let me not trust in words, or sighs, or tears, but
love thee even as thou hast commanded. Let me feel, and then I
shall know, what it is to love thee with all my heart.25
What is the assumed motivating source of our love of God and neighbor reflected
in this prayer? The stress is clearly on the rational recognition that it is our duty:
we should develop a habit of loving simply because it is right. But note the desire
to “feel” mentioned in the last line. In this context the request is for an empirical
validation of our love for God; and its primary purpose appears to be assuring us
that we are indeed fulfilling our duty. Even so, there is the suggestion that Wesley
had some doubt about the sufficiency of intellectual conviction alone to motivate
the life of Christ-like love.
Questioning the Adequacy of Platonic Moral Psychology
He would soon find that others shared this doubt. While a Platonic moral
psychology was widely valued in eighteenth-century Anglicanism (in significant
part because of its defense of self-determination), there were alternative voices
that branded its stress on duty, rational control, and habit formation as “Pelagian.”
In this judgment they echoed the challenge that St. Augustine had raised to
appropriations of Plato’s moral psychology in the early church. In his spiritual
pilgrimage Augustine had struggled and failed to gain habituated rational control
over his passions. He drew two conclusions from this failure: 1) that such
attempts trust in ineffective human efforts rather than in divine gracious inter-
vention; and 2) that reason is more the slave than the master of the passions. The
alternative moral psychology that Augustine developed remains one of the
clearest examples of deterministic “voluntarism” in Christian thought.26 He
argued that all human moral choices and actions flow from our ruling affections;
reason cannot thwart this flow, and there is no other source of volition. As a result
of the fall, all humans are born with
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bent affections that can give rise only to sinful actions. Nothing we attempt in our
own power can successfully suppress or remove these bent affections. However,
in regeneration God graciously implants—in the elect—new affections that then
naturally manifest themselves in holy living (to the degree allowed within the
constraints of our present conflicted situation).
Wesley’s deeper encounter with this Augustinian stream of Christian
spirituality (via the English Moravians) in 1738, at the climax of a period of his
own spiritual struggle, sensitized him to the subtle tendency of preoccupation
with human habit formation to eclipse the conviction of God’s gracious
prevenience in salvation.27 The encounter also reenforced his growing doubts
about the ability of rational conviction alone to effectuate human action.
A New Role for the Affections in Wesley’s Mature Moral Psychology
But what more was needed? In the interactions leading up to Aldersgate
Wesley’s focus sharpened on the importance of “feeling” the love of God. But
this time it was not so much his love for God that he longed to feel, it was God’s
reconciling love for him—an experience which he described in the biblical terms
of  “having the love of God shed abroad in his heart, through the Holy Ghost
which is given unto him.”28 This is what he received that night at Aldersgate
Street, as he felt his heart “strangely warmed” and found that he could now trust
that he was pardoned.29
From that point on in his preaching Wesley consistently encouraged his
hearers to expect and pray that they might experience the love of God shed abroad
in their hearts, and his detractors immediately began charging that he was
fostering “enthusiasm.”30 Some of Wesley’s sharpest rebuttals concentrate on the
importance of keeping emotions like joy, peace, and love central to religion, lest it
degenerate into a “dry, dead carcass.”31 His broader treatments make clear that his
interest is not simply in such emotions for their own sake but in the invaluable
role that he was now convinced they play in moral psychology. In contrast to
earlier suggestions, the background assumption of Wesley’s mature moral
psychology became: “all that can be said of the beauty and advantage of virtue
and the deformity and ill effect of vice [i.e., rational persua-
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sion] alone cannot resist, much less overcome and heal, one irregular appetite or
passion.”32 It is only when we are personally convinced of God’s pardoning love
for us that “heavenly, healing light” breaks in upon our souls and we are
freed/enabled to love God and our neighbors as we ought (and as we have so
unsuccessfully longed to do).33
What is the source or basis of this “healing” conviction? Most often
Wesley speaks simply  of “feeling” the love of God shed abroad in our hearts. In
one more explicit treatment he insists that it cannot be based on a chain of
reasoning but must be known “by a kind of intuition.”34 His choice of this term is
not accidental, it placed him within a debate among eighteenth century British
empiricists who were developing an alternative to rationalist models of human
knowing. Reigning rationalist epistemology emphasized the fallibility of human
empirical experience and attributed our access to truth to the contribution of
reason—often in the form of innate ideas. The empiricists countered that reason is
a purely formal category, it can organize experience but it contributes no real
ideas of its own. They contended that almost all foundational truths are gained
receptively by our intellect—under the motto that there is “no idea in the mind
that is not first in the senses.” The only exception to this maxim that they allowed
was a small set of self-evident truths, such as geometrical axioms, that they
attributed to “intuition.” Empiricism was the epistemology most broadly defended
at Oxford when Wesley came as a student. He became a self-conscious adherent,
and sorted out the implications of this for his understanding of the Christian life
over the next few decades.35
One of the things that Wesley struggled with following Aldersgate was the
implications of empiricism for our knowledge of God and of God’s activity in our
lives. Since it is clear that this knowledge does not come through our physical
senses as directly as does our knowledge of the world, prominent empiricists like
John Locke concluded that knowledge of God is based on subsequent reasoning
about our physical experience. But this meant, as Locke made clear, that such
conclusions were inherently tentative and probablistic. Here was Wesley’s
problem: he did not see how tentative conviction about God embracing us in
pardoning love could provide the “freeing” effect that we need, and that he had
experienced. This led him to propose that God provides the primal assurance of
pardon by a more direct route—intuition. To account for this possibility he
posited (in direct contrast with Locke) that we have “spiritual senses” that
connect us with divine reality, on analogy with how our physical senses connect
us with physical reality.36
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By contrast with his need to work out a distinctive stance within empiricist
epistemology, Wesley had available already in his Oxford years a clear
articulation of the central implication of empiricism for moral psychology in the
growing stream of empiricist moral thought.37 In direct contrast to the Platonic
model of moral psychology which had dominated prior Anglican theology, this
stream argued that while reason can clarify the conditions and consequences of a
proposed course of action it was not capable of effecting our engagement in that
action. On analogy with empiricist claims in epistemology, they insisted that
humans are moved to action only as we are experientially affected. To put it in a
practical example: rational persuasion of the rightness of loving others is not
sufficient of itself to move us to do so; we are ultimately inclined and enabled to
love others only as we experience being loved ourselves. To drive home this point
empiricist moral thought increasingly called for a redefinition of the human
“will.” They criticized prior moral psychologies for either reducing the will to
being a mere cipher for intellectual conviction, or assuming it was an innate store
of power for spontaneous acts of volition. They argued that the will is instead
properly equated with the set of affections that all humans possess, and that these
affections are best understood as responsive in nature. The affections are not self-
generating springs of motive power, they incite us to action only when they are
affected.
Wesley’s exposure to this empiricist emphasis on the responsive nature of
the affections likely contributed to his growing sense of need to “feel” the love of
God prior to Aldersgate.38 His experience there, and continuing observation of the
healing benefits of spiritual affect among his Methodist people, confirmed him in
this empiricist stance. His mature model of heart religion was framed in terms of
this changed sense of the nature and importance of the affections.
The Dynamics of Wesley’s Heart Religion: A Change of Affections
While the early Wesley operated initially within his received “habituated
rational control” moral psychology, the transitions just traced explain the
consistency with which his writings after Aldersgate reflect a self-conscious
commitment to an empiricist-inspired “affectional” moral psychology.39  This
commitment took formal expression in his typical list of the
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faculties that constitute the Image of God in humanity: understanding, will,
liberty, and conscience. Note the conjunction of will and liberty on this list. Why
did he need both of these? The key reason is that Wesley (in good empiricist
form) rejected the conception of the will as a faculty that generates rational self-
determination. He used “will” instead simply as an inclusive term for the various
affections—the responsive motivating inclinations behind all human action.
This grounding of moral volition in affections suggests some similarities
with Augustine. It may also call to mind the radical empiricism of David Hume,
who portrayed the “will” as simply our automatic responses to whatever affects
us. Wesley could not accept the deterministic implications of either Augustine or
Hume. He did not judge them to be true to our experience, reason, Christian
tradition, or the teachings of Scripture. This led him to insist that in addition to
the will humans have a distinct faculty of “liberty.” While the will (i.e., the
responsive affections) provides our various actual inclinations to action, liberty is
our limited autonomous capacity to refuse to enact any particular inclination.
Though we cannot self-generate love, we do have the liberty to stifle responsive
loving! This insistence distanced Wesley’s mature moral psychology from both
philosophical and theological forms of determinism.
The Nature of the “Heart” in Wesley’s Anthropology
You may have noticed that “heart” does not appear on Wesley’s list of the
human faculties that constitute the image of God. Early Christian thought had
given the heart at least an indirect place on their list of moral faculties. Plato’s
moral psychology included the suggestion that reason was located in the brain,
the “spirited element” in the heart, and the passions in the liver. This tri-part
location of our morally relevant faculties—with its clear hierarchy—was part of
the package appropriated from Plato by early Christian moral thought. As the
actual physiological functions of the liver and heart were later clarified these
faculties (often packaged as the “mind”) all came to be associated primarily with
the brain. Wesley assumed this association.
While he recognized that literally the heart was just an organ for pumping
blood, Wesley often used “heart” in a metaphorical sense when discussing human
volition. These uses reflect his standard practice of speaking in biblical
terminology. But careful consideration suggests that
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he also turned to the metaphor of the heart as a way of articulating a more holistic
model of human volition, countering to some degree the dualism of reason versus
passion inherited from Plato’s moral psychology. In one of his most explicit
accounts Wesley correlates biblical language of the heart with our “inmost soul,”
and then stresses how this inner orientation of a Christian properly manifests itself
in outward “branches” like works of love and mercy.40 This would appear to make
the heart the seat of the inner springs of our outward words and actions, a
suggestion confirmed by the frequency with which Wesley uses the terms “heart”
and “affections” interchangeably.41 Given his mature emphasis on the responsive
nature of the affections, Wesley could also relate the heart to the “spiritual sense”
through which we intuit God’s love.42 The uses noted so far could imply that
Wesley used “heart” simply as the metaphorical equivalent of the will. But at
times he also equates heart with our inner “thoughts” (as compared to outward
words and actions).43 This latter usage hints that Wesley viewed the motivations
behind human action as ideally integrating the rational and emotional dimensions
of human life into holistic inclinations toward action. Such hints fit Wesley’s
parallel rejection of any suggestion that faith is barely a “speculative, rational
thing,” insisting instead that it is a holistic “disposition of the heart.”44 
The language of disposition brings us to one other common association in
Wesley’s references to the heart in relation to Christian life. He frequently
equates the heart with one’s “tempers.”45 These passages puzzle modern readers
who think of “tempers” almost exclusively in terms of emotional outbursts.
Wesley is using the term in a much broader sense that was common in the
eighteenth century, where “temper” referred to any enduring character
disposition. The remnant of this earlier meaning comes through when we speak
today of tempered metal, which has been strengthened and given a characteristic
shape. Wesley used the term in specific reference to the human affections. While
our affections are responsive, he was convinced that they need not be simply
transitory, they can be focused and strengthened into enduring dispositions. Thus,
in his terminology the capacity for simple responsive love is an affection, while a
developed enduring disposition to love (or to reject love!) is a temper.46 And the
heart is the seat of the tempers.
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The Mature Focus of Wesley’s Heart Religion – Transforming Tempers
The preceding discussion of the “heart” allows us finally to characterize
Wesley’s mature moral psychology: he transformed his inherited “habituated
rational control” model into one that stressed “habituated holistic affections” (i.e.
tempers). In traditional terms this placed him close to Aquinas, who had
appropriated the “virtue ethic” of Aristotle. Thus recent interpreters have often
spoken of Wesley’s mature model as a virtue ethic.47 This is a helpful description,
but it does not highlight the responsive aspect of Wesley’s moral psychology as
clearly as does using his own more typical language of the affections.
If “heart” refers to our inner motivating inclinations, then a “heart
religion” must highlight the importance of these inclinations to proper outward
religious/moral activity. Wesley credited his deeper recognition of the role of the
heart within religious life to reading Thomas a’ Kempis in 1725. In keeping with
his early moral psychology assumptions, this reading mainly impressed upon him
that “God’s law extends to all our thoughts as well as words and actions.”48 At
this stage Wesley’s focus on heart religion was on sincere efforts to maintain a
holy heart.
We noted earlier Wesley’s growing sense of the need to feel God’s
pardoning love in the period leading up to Aldersgate. In the afterglow of his
experience there his focus broadened to include the vital role of the warmed heart
in heart religion.
But Wesley was always clear following Aldersgate that he was not
interested in promoting atypical emotional experiences for their own sake. What
warms our heart so strangely is an encounter with God that convinces us at the
core of our being that “Thy nature and Thy name is Love.”49 As we experience
this sense of God’s pardoning love we find to our delight that we are enabled to
love God and our neighbor, and we are filled with love, peace, and joy. 50 The key
value of the strange warming of our heart in Wesley’s mature heart religion was
that it created the possibility of a responsive heart.
Wesley was also clear from the beginning that God’s purpose in warming
our heart is not simply to awaken momentary responsiveness, God is providing
the possibility for a change in our enduring dispositions. That is why Wesley’s
standard inquiry of those claiming authentic Christian life became: “Is their
religion the religion of the heart; a renewal of soul in the image of God? … Are
they free from pride, from
17
vanity, from malice and envy; from ambition and avarice; from passion and lust;
from every uneasy and unlovely temper?”51 Put in positive terms, his standard
description of those enjoying the religion of the heart became that their hearts
were “filled with ‘long-suffering, gentleness, fidelity, goodness, meekness,
temperance,’ and all the other fruits of the [Holy] Spirit; in a word, with whatever
dispositions are holy, are heavenly, or divine.”52 The defining goal of Wesley’s
heart religion was clearly this change of affections.
This goal reflects the centrality of the tempers to Wesley’s mature
understanding of both sin and holiness. In the case of sin, he came to insist that
the issue was more than individual wrong actions. He frequently discussed sin in
terms of a threefold division: sinful nature or tempers, sinful words, and sinful
actions. The point of this division was that sinful actions and words flow from
corrupted tempers, so the problem of sin must ultimately be addressed at this
affectional level.53 Correspondingly, Wesley’s mature definition of Christian life
placed primary emphasis on this inward dimension, “the renewal of our heart after
the image of [God who] created us.”54 This renewal involves both the quickening
of our affections in response to the affect of God’s love poured in our hearts and
the tempering of these affections into holy dispositions. Since holiness of thought,
word, and action would flow from such renewal, Wesley identified the essential
goal of all true religion as the recovery of holy tempers.55 His heart religion was
ultimately a religion of the tempered heart.
The Framework of Wesley’s Heart Religion – The Means of Grace
There are obviously strong continuities between the Wesley’s early focus
on the holy heart and his mature focus on the heart of tempered affections. The
crucial differences lie in matters of emphasis concerning the dynamics and means
of seeking heart religion.56 To begin with, it is clear in Wesley’s early writings
that his earnest pursuit of holiness was driven by a desire for assurance of God’s
justifying acceptance. Central to Aldersgate was Wesley’s deep recognition that
existing holiness is not a precondition of God’s gracious acceptance; rather, it is
the assurance of that acceptance that makes holiness of heart and life a possibility
for us. In marked contrast to our prior quote from a 1731 letter, the mature
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Wesley repeatedly insisted:
We must be holy of heart, and holy in life…. But we must love
God, before we can be holy at all; this being the root of all
holiness. Now we cannot love God, till we know he loves us. “We
love him, because he first loved us.” And we cannot know his
pardoning love to us, till his Spirit witnesses it to our spirit.57
There are indications surrounding Aldersgate that Wesley initially
assumed (drawing on suggestions of the English Moravians) that our corrupt
tempers would be immediately and completely transformed into holy tempers
when we embraced God’s pardoning love. It was not long before he admitted that
corrupt tempers remain in the new believer, inclining them to sinful acts. But he
quickly added that the Spirit’s restored presence in our lives does have the
immediate enlivening affect of enabling us to assert our “liberty” in preventing
these tempers from reigning over our actions. The Spirit’s goal is to bring even
greater freedom by transforming our tempers, so that our deepest inclinations are
to acts of love for God and neighbor. But the mature Wesley became convinced
that God does not typically infuse holy tempers instantaneously. Rather, God’s
regenerating grace awakens in believers the “seeds” of such virtues.58 These seeds
then strengthen and take shape as we “grow in grace.”
Why did Wesley assume that God would work in this gradual way?
Because he believed that the One whom we know in Jesus Christ is a God of
responsible grace.59 This God loves humanity too much to withhold from anyone
the gracious affect that makes us response-able. And this God loves us too much
to deprive us of an authentic role in responsible appropriation of this gracious
affect. Saving relationship with such a God is inherently a co-operant
relationship. As Wesley once described it:
[T]he life of God in the soul of a believer … immediately and
necessarily implies the continual inspiration of God’s Holy Spirit;
God’s breathing into the soul, and the soul’s breathing back what it
first receives from God; a continual action of God upon the soul,
and a re-action of the soul upon God; an unceasing presence of
God, the loving, pardoning God, manifested to the heart, and
perceived by faith; and an unceasing return of love, praise, and
prayer, offering up all the thoughts of our hearts, all the words of
our tongues, all the works of our hands, all our body, soul, and
spirit, to be a holy sacrifice, acceptable unto God in Christ Jesus.60
This description clearly involves more than the “passive” cooperation of
trusting God’s offer of pardon. It is not faith alone, but faith
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working by love, that Wesley often identifies as the essence of heart religion.61 Of
course, he would immediately remind us that the possibility of our “working” is
grounded in God’s prevenient gracious empowering affect. That is why the
mature Wesley warned his followers of the folly of seeking the end of holy
tempers apart from the means that God has graciously provided.62 True heart
religion is undergirded and framed by the means of grace.
What means of grace were central to Wesley’s mature heart religion? We
noted above that the most prominent means that he turned to in his early pursuit
of holiness were ones that strengthened his rational resolve to obey God’s
commands. Contrast the broader range and role of the means of grace in this
typical account of the mature Wesley:
In a Christian believer love sits upon the throne which is erected in
the inmost soul; namely, love of God and man, which fills the
whole heart, and reigns without a rival. In a circle near the throne
are all holy tempers; — longsuffering, gentleness, meekness,
fidelity, temperance; and if any other were comprised in “the mind
which was in Christ Jesus.” In an exterior circle are all the works
of mercy, whether to the souls or bodies of men. By these we
exercise all holy tempers; by these we continually improve them,
so that all these are real means of grace, although this is not
commonly adverted to. Next to these are those that are usually
termed works of piety; — reading and hearing the word, public,
family, private prayer, receiving the Lord’s Supper, fasting or
abstinence. Lastly, that his followers may the more effectually
provoke one another to love, holy tempers, and good works, our
blessed Lord has united them together in one body, the Church.63
Notice how this account relates the means of grace directly to the goal of
forming holy tempers. It also reflects Wesley’s hard-won conviction (against
other one-sided perspectives in the Christian tradition) that the means of grace
serve not only as avenues by which God conveys gracious empowerment, they are
also formative disciplines by which we strengthen and shape our character into
Christ-likeness.64 Wesley made the means of grace central to heart religion
because within the various means we are exposed to the ever-deeper empowering
affect of the Spirit and we are prodded to exercise our affections, shaping them
into holy tempers.
Concern for providing his followers with this twofold benefit is evident in
the specific set of  means of grace that Wesley developed as the framework of
Methodist life.65 In addition to regular use of such valued
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traditional means as prayer, liturgy, and eucharist, Wesley enjoined those serious
about heart religion to live within the rhythms of less common means like class
meetings, love feasts, and works of mercy. Some of these other means were
adopted by Wesley primarily for their tendency to open us to God’s empowering
affect while others were incorporated more for their role in habituating
(tempering) our affections. As a case in point, Wesley’s stress on works of mercy
in the preceding quote focuses on the second benefit, though he valued as well the
empowering affect of visiting the poor.66
Wesley’s mature set of recommended means of grace also reflects the
holism that emerged in his moral psychology. While he naturally retained the
classic means that are particularly suited for rational enlightenment and
challenge—Scripture reading, sermon, and prayer—he protected against
suggestions that these are uniquely privileged or sufficient by themselves for
nurturing Christian life. He did this in part by his repeated emphasis on more
affective means like love feast and eucharist. Equally significant was his
insistence on communal means like the class meeting and society worship.
The mature Wesley’s concern for a holistic approach to forming holy
tempers can be discerned in his practical-theological editing of devotional
materials for his Methodist people. Consider the example of his publication of
“An Account of the Passions, or Natural Affections: extracted from Dr. [Isaac]
Watts” in the Arminian Magazine in 1782–3.67 Wesley clearly valued Watts’s
work, repeating such advice as: “Whenever you feel the more kindly [i.e., loving]
sort of passions working in you, encourage and promote them that they may fix in
your heart more firmly the principles of goodness and form your very nature and
temper to virtue and religion.”68 But Wesley’s extract omits a central section
where Watts provides general recommendations for controlling and forming the
affections.69 The most likely reason is that Watts deals exclusively with the need
to form right judgments—reflecting his assumption that wrong affections arise
from mistakes of judgment. His recommendations for correcting pride, as one
sample, include such exhortations as: consider who your are and what you shall
be, think on the condescension of Jesus and imitate this pattern, and think of the
damage that pride has done.70 Wesley would have seen such exhortations, while
well meant, as ineffective in dealing with pride unless conjoined with the
affectional benefits of visiting the poor and exercising self-denial.71 The well-
tempered heart requires a well-rounded set of the means of grace.
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The Goal of Wesley’s Heart Religion – Christian Perfection
How close did Wesley hope that his people could come, through
responsive participation in the recommended means of grace, to the end of
recovered holy tempers in this life? His famous, and controversial, claim was that
they could reach entire sanctification or “Christian Perfection.” The place to begin
unpacking this claim is to stress that entire sanctification is not an isolated reality
for Wesley; it is a dynamic level of maturity within the overall process of
sanctification, the level characteristic of adult Christian life. Since he considered
love to be the essence of Christian life he could define Christian Perfection as
“the humble, gentle, patient love of God, and our neighbor, ruling our tempers,
words, and actions.”72 Notice that love is not only said to be present, it is ruling.
God’s love is shed abroad in the lives of all Christians, awakening their
responsive love for God and others. But this responsive love is often weak,
sporadic, and contested by contrary affections in new believers. They have
sufficient grace to prevent these contrary affections from reigning, but they still
remain. In the lives of the entirely sanctified Wesley maintained that responsive
love is strengthened and patterned “to the point that there is no mixture of any
contrary affections—all is peace and harmony.”73
It is important to remember that Wesley’s focus on affections in
describing Christian Perfection was not intended as an alternative to actions. He
assumed that acts of love would flow from a temper of love. Yet, he also
recognized that ignorance, mistakes, and other human frailties often distort the
passage from affection to action. It was in this sense that he tired of the debate
over whether Christian Perfection was “sinless.” He did indeed believe that it
consisted in holy tempers, but not that it was characterized by infallible
expression of those tempers in actions.
Perhaps the best way to capture Wesley’s affectional view of entire
sanctification is to say that he was convinced that the Christian life did not have
to remain a life of perpetual struggle. He believed that our sin-distorted human
lives can be responsibly transformed through God’s loving grace to the point
where we are truly freed to love God and others consistently. Christians can
aspire to take on the disposition of Christ, and live out that disposition within the
constraints of our human infirmities.74 To deny this possibility would be to deny
the sufficiency of God’s
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empowering grace—to make the power of sin greater than that of grace. And it
would be to revise Wesley’s mature heart religion.
The Dethronement of Wesley’s Heart Religion: A “Change of
Affections”
When one surveys Wesley’s present ecclesiastical and theological
descendants it does not take long to sense that his conception of heart religion has
been widely dethroned and replaced by models with varying degrees of revision.
Few retain his confidence in the possibility of Christian Perfection. Central
elements of his balanced set of the means of grace (such as class meetings, love
feasts, and visiting the poor) have been broadly abandoned. The importance of
forming holy tempers is seldom mentioned. Stress on feeling the love of God is
often suspect. And some are uncomfortable with very language of heart religion.
What can account for such broad changes? Subsequent chapters will probe
several major factors that have been involved. I will restrict myself to suggesting
how a philosophical “change of affections” on the topic of moral psychology
among Wesley’s heirs has contributed to their (conscious and unconscious)
revisions of his model.75
The more one appreciates how integrally Wesley’s mature conception of
heart religion was framed by his moral psychology the easier it is to understand
how difficult it would be to maintain this precise conception if one rejects his
moral psychology. This is exactly the situation in which Wesley’s theological
descendants rapidly placed themselves, particularly in the North American
context. By the beginning of the nineteenth century an affectional moral
psychology had come to be equated in popular culture with determinism, due to
the broad influence of the forms of this psychology championed by David Hume
and Jonathan Edwards. As a result Wesley’s heirs increasingly found it hard to
recognize his characteristic moral psychology, let alone defend it. The aversion to
determinism that they inherited from Wesley ironically led them to rally instead
behind those who were reasserting that our hope for authentic moral/spiritual
action lies in our innate power of rational choice.
It is equally ironic that Wesley helped pave the way for this switch. As
deterministic models of affectional moral psychology proliferated in the latter part
of the eighteenth century Wesley found it increasingly necessary to stress how his
model avoided this implication. He addressed
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this point most directly—in dialogue with Edwards, Hume, and others—in his
1775 Thoughts Upon Necessity.76 He also kept a sharp eye for any allies he could
call to his support. In 1790 he extracted and prepared for the Arminian Magazine
“An Essay on the Liberty of Moral Agents” that he averred was the strongest and
most beautiful treatise on the subject that he had ever seen.77 This essay was
actually a short excerpt from near the end of Thomas Reid’s Essays on the Active
Powers of Man (1788).78 In this section of his Essays Reid argues that motives to
action are not invincible in truly moral agents, they must have some liberty to will
or not to will in accordance with their motives. If one read only this section Reid
would appear to be defending a position quite close to Wesley. There are only
passing hints in the excerpted material that Reid’s overall model of moral
psychology developed in the rest of the book had a different thrust.79 Wesley’s
careful selection from Reid proved to be too subtle for his progeny to pick up.
Having been pointed to Reid, Methodists on both sides of the Atlantic were soon
appropriating his overall moral psychology. American Methodists in particular
gave Reid and his disciples an authoritative status by republishing their works and
making them required reading in the “course of study” for traveling elders.
How did Reid’s overall moral psychology differ from Wesley’s emphasis
on habituated holistic affections? 80 In reaction to Hume’s deterministic model of
the affections Reid championed the need to assert rational control over the
passions or affections. Central to his argument was the insistence that the “will”
had been wrongly identified with the affections; it is instead our inherent rational
ability to choose between (or suppress) the various stimuli that motivate action. In
this distinction Reid was excluding any holistic intentionality from the
affections—leaving them arational at best, and perhaps as inherently irrational.
Through these moves he reclaimed elements of the earlier rational control moral
psychology, but Reid added a distinctive twist. He asserted that only intentional
acts have moral status. This led him to depict habituated tendencies (like
Wesley’s “tempers”) as strictly amoral—if not indeed obstacles to truly moral
acts—since they operate with minimal conscious intentionality.
In other words, Reid introduced the decisionistic rational control moral
psychology that (with the reenforcement of Immanuel Kant) has dominated the
last two centuries of Western culture and moral thought. Rather than stressing the
formation of enduring inclinations as vital to increasing our moral freedom, this
model holds up as the ideal expres-
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sion of freedom those times when we transcend our existing inclinations in the -
effort to achieve decisive (and fleeting!) moral autonomy. It reflects the
Enlightenment tendency to equate freedom with casting off prior influences. 
Reid’s definition of the will—as the power for rational self-determining
decisions—rapidly replaced Wesley’s affectional definition in nineteenth century
Methodist theology. In further consonance with Reid, Methodist theologians were
soon portraying the affections as inherently irrational, needing regulation by the
more primary human faculty of reason. Likewise, they typically judged habits and
inclinations to have moral status only when voluntarily embraced, and were prone
to depict them more as obstacles to than as facilitators of “free” decisions.
One of the things that the history of Christian thought makes clear is that
the relationship between Christian life and theological convictions is reciprocal.
Disenchantment with or changes in practices provoke reconsideration of
theological stances, while shifts in theological convictions have a progressive
impact on Christian practice. At its best this interaction is an ongoing spiral. This
was not quite the case with the relatively abrupt replacement of Wesley’s
affectional moral psychology by later Methodist theologians. Their change was
provoked more by apologetic reaction to a competing theology than by significant
disenchantment with or alterations of Wesley’s pattern of heart religion among
Methodists of the time. But as this technical change took hold it inevitably
affected related theological convictions, and eventually impacted the daily
assumptions and practices of Methodist piety.
There were several affects on correlated areas of doctrine. One of the most
significant was that salvation was increasingly presented in Methodist theology as
more a matter of human will (portrayed as our inherent “gracious ability”) than of
the regenerating work of the Spirit.81 The concern of nineteenth century Methodist
theologians was focused much more on how to avoid any infringements on human
freedom by the emotional/intellectual dynamics of spiritual life than on Wesley’s
focal issue of how to awaken affectional commitment in persons who were
already conventional (i.e., merely intellectual) Christians. This took pastoral
expression in moves to tone down the emotional dimension of Methodist
worship—for example, by converting campmeetings into Chautauqua meetings.82
And it sparked the reactionary splits of the holiness movement and later
pentecostalism.
The decisionistic element of Reid’s moral psychology raised a particular
challenge for central aspects of Wesley’s notion of Christian
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Perfection and his model for nurturing holiness. Nineteenth-century American
Methodism splintered into several competing camps over how to reformulate this
doctrine, and increasingly chose to ignore it, though it has remained as at least an
annoying “pebble in the shoe” of the tradition.83
On a parallel track, the decisionist tone of their moral psychology led
these Methodist theologians to treat the various means of grace more as “duties”
than as formative disciplines, and it was not long before Methodist laity were
debating the warrant for requiring such duties as the class meeting. This was
reenforced by the rationalist element of their revised moral psychology, which
inclined nineteenth century Methodist theologians to give primacy to the classic
“rational” means of grace—Scripture, sermon, and prayer—effectively devaluing
other means like eucharist and love feasts.84
Other possible impacts of this change in moral psychology could be
mentioned. It should also be stressed how some of Wesley’s practices remained in
place—at least in certain subgroups of his descendants—long after the
assumptions undergirding them had been revised. I will leave it to subsequent
chapters to probe these areas and draw attention to other dynamics that must be
taken into consideration. I am content to suggest that a philosophical “change of
affections” has played a role in the larger picture. Thus, if we are serious about
recovering something like Wesley’s heart religion today it may well require our
own “change of affections,” as we challenge the elements of the decisionistic
rational control model that still pervade our culture and churches.
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